a lawsuit tangentially involves any economic area in which the Community acts or may act. Technically, in the role it provides for the originally seized court, the article sets up a procedure resembling the certification of questions for appeal in our federal system," or the granting of a certificate of importance to permit appeal that is found in some state codes In a substantive and admittedly loose sense, it creates a kind of federal-question jurisdiction for the Court of Justice; in contrast, articles 173 and 175 merely provide for limited appeal from the actions of Community agencies.
This Article is a status report on the use of the certified-question device by the national courts of the member states It is not, except incidentally, a study of the legal problems inherent in the provision. There are many studies of the latter variety,' but little research has been done on the effectiveness of article 177, on the factors that have influenced that effectiveness, on 4. See 28 U.S.C. § § 1254, 1255 (1964) . For a discussion of the development and scope of the certification device see R. ROBERTSON & F. KIRKHAM, JuRISDICrION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TE UNrrED STATES 243-97 (2d ed. R. Wolfson & P. Kurland ig5i).
5. See, e.g ., IsoA ILL. ANN. STAT. § 316 (Smith-Hurd 1968) ; N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 3 (b)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1968) .
6. Some pre-x964 cases are included, but a fuller search was made for only the past 5 years. An apparently complete repository of case citations may be found in the serial publication of the REv. 296 (1963) . For an economic discussion see E. VoL..wRm, DiE WIRTscNAPTLicHM BEDEUTUNG DER RE cTSPRECHUNG ZUM MONTANVERTRAG (1967) .
Similarly, article 15o of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298 57 (1967) . For an important statement on the chances of substantive and administrative integration see Hellwig, Das Wetbewerbsrecht bei der Fusion der drei Vertrige, in Baicrra Zur. EWG-KATEuaLLac" 211 (1967) .
7.
English language studies include G. BEBR, supra note 3; P. HAY, FEDERALIsM AND SUPRANA-TIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 102ff (1966) i8o-99 (1967) .
Comprehensive studies in other languages are many. First should be mentioned C. ToSIUsCHAT, Dm oERIc=c cNE VORABENTSCssEmUNO NACH DEN VERTRXGEN UBER DIE EUROPXISCHEN GEMEIN-SCHAFTE (x964). Substantial discussions appearing since then include J. HELLNER, DAS VoRAcEvmR-possible improvements in the law, or on the lessons the Community's experience provides for similar efforts to insinuate a federal judicial institution into a regional economic or political association.
The data can be viewed from a variety of perspectives or classifying approaches, such as subject matter, national origin, form of litigation, and type of certifying court. One test, however, should precede all efforts at classification: When was article 177 not applied when it could have been? This type of negative proof is difficult, not only because of the problems of search, but also because a subjective determination must be made in each case whether referral could reasonably have been expected. A factual review of each such case would unduly extend this paper, yet some proof must be presented to justify the conclusion that in any given case a reasonable certification was rejected or ignored. That it is an important part of the inquiry in assessing the effectiveness of article 177 or similar provisions seems clear.'
I. THE CERTIFIED QUESTION IN APPEALS FROM ADMINIsTRTIVE AcTIONs
The pathbreakers in developing the certification device were the Dutch courts, which began in the early 196o's to submit to the Court of Justice the basic interpretation problem-whether the more commonly invoked treaty provisions were programmatic only, requiring national legislative or administrative implementation, or whether they directly established private rights in the face of conflicting national provisions.' It was not until the basic van Gend & Loos case' was assimilated by national authorities-perhaps not until the Costa-E.N.E.L. decision of 1964 "-that the role of the Court of Justice in treaty interpretation was confirmed and the task begun of deciding whether particular national statutes and regulations were compatible with the relevant treaty provisions. This task has involved three basic groups of state programs now within the competence of the Community: social security for migrant workers; quasi-tariff tolls, levies, and taxes; and protectionism for state enterprises.
These programs are listed in increasing order of political sensitivity. Reluctance or readiness to certify questions of administrative law, however, displays definite national patterns, even after accounting for variations in the intensity or political delicacy of the subject at issue. Only social security problems have been certified consistently 2 Even in the relatively neutral field of tariff-related taxes-where the issue is the compatibility of a national levy with treaty provisions prohibiting increased tariffs or tariff-like leviesquestions commonly referred to the Court of Justice by Dutch' and now even German 4 courts are routinely ignored or affirmatively kept out of 9. See, e.g The more political and sensitive the issue, the more marked the divergence. One of the more flagrant instances concerns the refusal of French courts to subject their national regulatory scheme for oil importation and distribution to the test of compatibility with treaty provisions. 8 Faced with a procedural format that precluded resort to the doctrine that local law rather than treaty interpretation was at issue,' the French courts resorted to an equally dubious but more traditional doctrine dispensing with such interpretive requests when the treaty provision involved was an "acte clair" permitting of only one interpretation." An Italian court, faced with the HALLSTEIN 431, 443-44 (2966) . The Court of Justice does enjoy the power to interpret treaty norms and thus to indicate the lack of conformity of a particular municipal rule therewith. See Lenhoff, supra note 6, at 297-98; Riesenfeld & Buxbaum, supra note io, at x56--57; Schlochauer, supra. But see Ule, supra note 7, at io.
This problem is related to the distinction between abstract interpretation of a treaty norm and its application to a specific problem being litigated in the certifying court. Here, too, distinctions are more formal than real. See Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 74; Nicolaysen, Comment, 2 EUtRoPaECrr 146 (2967); Ryziger, Comment, 1965 CAisEns 255.
And in turn these problems are related to the question of the relation between the certification procedure and the ability of the affected party to challenge the legality of a municipal or even a Community "regulation" (in this context not a term of art) in the absence of standing to challenge it directly. (1968) . same issues, called for certification without ado." Undoubtedly the theory of the "acte clair" is useful, especially once the fullness of time has embedded some of these rather general treaty norms in an ample sediment of case law;22 but its use and recurrent misuse" 5 at this stage of Community development is a sign of resistance. This attitude has for now culminated in the recent decision of the Conseil d'Atat holding that regulation 19 of the Council of Ministers of the Economic Community, which forbids certain domestic preferences in the cereals sector, was superseded in France by the laterenacted law governing tariff preferences for Algerian wheat A request for a Court of Justice ruling might well have led to a similar result, given the circumstances of Algeria's departure from metropolitan status, but no such request was even considered. The case has occasioned comments of the sort usually associated with spurned lovers, " but it is only a logical and expectable extension of the long-standing French position.
The German situation is more mixed. Following an initial reluctance' to accept the "direct applicability" concept that is so enthusiastically promoted by the Court of Justice, the past few years have witnessed an increasing tendency to accept the certification procedure in most of the relevant administrative-law fields. Indeed, 1968 saw a spate of such cases, the most important involving the legitimacy of the new turnover equalization-tax regime;" and this despite the overstated warning that the administrative courts were in danger of drowning in the flood of tax appeals raising this 
In lieu of the case citations see Meier, Die April-Urteile des Europaischen Gerichtshofes im
Rechtsstreit um die Umsatzausgleichsteuer, 14 AWD x67 (1968) .
question. In a sense, the determined effort to resolve these various questions of compatibility at once through a set of references to the Court of Justice probably cleared the scene by eliciting the expected rulings of legitimacy from the Court. 8
II. CERTIFICATIONS IN LITIGATION BETWEEN PRIVATE PARTIES
The most important Community subject matter involved in private litigation has been antitrust law. Its quantitative importance need hardly be stressed. 2 ' As a result, the impact of community attitudes on the national courts, and consequently the chance for the development of a "federal judiciary," can best be measured in the field of antitrust law. In a subtler way, antitrust cases test the impact of a particular substantive Community legal regime upon national courts and thus upon national law. With few exceptions, the subjects at issue in the administrative proceedings discussed above do not directly impinge upon judicial lawmaking at the national level. There is no particular lawmaking significance-political issues such as a local court's eccentric challenge to the entire treaty structure aside-in sending a question of the compatibility of a national tariff regulation or even turnover-tax law to the Court of Justice. The role of the national courts in reviewing these regulations and laws is not so essentially a normparticularizing one as when they give flesh and substance to the general concepts of "unfair competition" or "restraint of trade." In the former fields, as the French experience demonstrates, an essentially political attitude may well prevail, and national variations in receptiveness to a supranational judiciary may be correspondingly significant. Nevertheless, the creative function of the judiciary, its common law role, is not involved in any significant way. If one seeks to discover whether this common law role engenders its own functional attitudes, the antitrust cases provide a useful testing ground. Finally, these private litigation cases, along with administrative appeals, may yield insights into the relationship between such a certification procedure and the substantive development of the particular field at issue. Assuming for the purposes of the inquiry a value judgment in favor of fairly rigorous antitrust enforcement, I propose to examine the consequences to that policy of using or not using the article 177 procedure. Since the Court of Justice has decided only five cases in the antitrust field (1968) . The reporter segment of WuW, "Entscheidungssammlung," which is consecutively paginated for each court, will be cited WuW plus judicial abbreviation. under this procedure," and only three others are presently pending, 31 what will in fact be tested is the impact upon antitrust development of not using the preliminary question process.
In the typical private suit a party charged with unfair competition, breach of contract, or inducement to breach of contract because of a distribution practice conflicting with that used or imposed by the complainant counters with the argument that the contractual regime it is charged with violating is itself a violation of article 85 or 86 of the Rome Treaty. Obviously the most common example will be the claim by a nonsigning retailer that its sales of price-maintained goods below the resale price fixed by the manufacturer or a complaining distributor are immunized because the contractual resale price maintenance scheme is incompatible with these treaty provisions.
A nation-by-nation examination of the antitrust cases turns up an interesting mixture of attitudes. In France, where the most extreme opposition to supranational institutions has been vividly and politically displayed in the administrative decisions," the courts have rejected every effort but one of a litigating party to obtain an article 177 certification. 33 Several courts, however, have on their own interpreted article 85 of the treaty and the implementing regulation 17 so as to strengthen Brussels' hand. 4 Regulation 17, which governs inter alia the distribution of competence between the EEC Commission and the national authorities, provides for a suspension of national proceedings once the Commission's Directorate General for Competition has itself initiated proceedings in the same matter. This requirement has been read by a few French courts, by no means the majority, as extending to proceedings pending before national courts as well as before administrative authorities, a reading much disputed and still in some doubt" I read this paradoxical position as a reflection of the strong French stand against restrictive vertical distribution arrangements, which happen to be involved in almost all of these proceedings. Though increasingly riddled with exceptions, the French law expresses a traditional policy in favor of open distribution channels. "7 As a result, those courts still sympathetic to open distribution may accept the suspensive effect of certification with equanimity, if indeed they do not actually seek out the certification procedure, in order to provide the maverick distributor with a maximum period of immunized operations; though the issue of the legality of the producer's distribution system under newer French developments may, depending upon the Commission's action, still have to be faced by them. Even this much conceded, however, it is important to note that the majority of French cases reported have rejected suspension as well as certification," 8 and have thus protected "legitimate" distribution channels against such outsiders. This has occurred in situations that the still-developing French law now exempts from the statutory sanction, whether or not the still-developing Community law would do so. 39 The one French decision resulting in a certified question° arose under circumstances confirming this interpretation of the recent French attitude toward restrictive distribution practices. A German tractor producer had sold a number of tractors to a French company, pursuant to a contract appointing the latter its exclusive distributor in France and requiring it to refrain from dealing in competing machines. In defending against a suit for breach of contract, the French company claimed the illegality and thus nullity of the agreement under Community standards. Because the Commission had not been notified of the agreement within the period specified in article 5 of regulation 17, an article 85(3) exemption was no longer available. Faced with the clear ruling of the Commission in the Grundig case 4 ' (then being appealed) that such agreements were ipso facto subject to article 85(I) and could escape nullity only through an 85 (3) sought an interpretation of the substantive criteria of article 85(I) (essentially the main issue in Grundig); secondly and more significantly, it asked whether the nullity provision of article 85(2) was intended to void the entire agreement containing the restrictive clause or only part of the agreement, as determined by the local law governing severability. The Court of Justice's response to these two questions, opting for the milder interpretation, 4 2 enabled the French court, on remand, to uphold the complainant's right of action 3 This case, in short, suggests that the certified-question procedure might be used to promote and seek confirmation of a national antitrust policy, but not to provide an inroad for a new, or at least a more vigorous, Community antitrust policy not in harmony with national standards.
In the Netherlands, where if anything the opposite antitrust policy prevails as to problems of "orderly" distribution, and where outsiders' efforts to breach these channels are not favored, a conflict between the domestic policy and the equally fervent Dutch political position in favor of judicial integration at the Community level 4 might well be expected. As it happens, the more recent of the two Dutch cases certifying questions to the Court of Justice involved industrial property rights; "6 but more significantly, both certification decisions at the same time granted interim relief to the complaining party whose contract or infringement suit was counterattacked on article 85 grounds. Thus, Dutch adherence to federal principles has not been allowed to interfere with maintaining the domestic antitrust laws any more than necessary. Equally significant, of course, is the spotty record of even the Dutch courts on certification. Against these two cases must be balanced two refusals to certify by the Hoge Raad, the Dutch Supreme Court, which normally is obligated under article 177 to invoke that procedure, once on the ground that the issue was raised too late ' the Court of Justice in the Parke, Davis case, "9 which, it should be recalled, came to that court not from the Hoge Raad but from a court of intermediate jurisdiction." 0 That same intermediate court had twice earlier rejected pleas for certification in essentially identical situations;51 and so, at least four times, had courts of first instance. 2 All in all, then, one can argue that any drive toward judicial integration has come off second best to the desire to maintain the existing substantive regime in this field of the law.
The Belgian situation is essentially similar. As of early 1968 only one case had been certified to the Court of Justice, 5 " again protecting the challenged exclusive distributorship against the pirating distributor through interim enforcement of Belgian law. Further, in at least nine cases decided since 1962 the various courts involved withheld certification, more often without" 4 but sometimes with 5 explicit discussion of their reasons: in some instances on the basis of the asserted limit of the restrictive practice to "intrastate commerce," 6 in others because of a dubious reading of the Court's early Bosch" decision as validating agreements timely submitted to the Commission under the notification procedure of regulation 17Y Others may have turned on whether article 85 extends to "foreign commerce," a problem admittedly raised by its unusual wording but tentatively answered affirmatively by the Commission" and thus very much ready for an authoritative ruling by the Court of Justice. As two of the nine cases indicate, however, retention may be used to promote, as well as to avoid, Community standards. In these two cases the Belgian courts held the treaty antitrust rules violated;61 in one of them this was, indeed, dispositive 6 Like the French, the Belgians have been reasonably friendly toward the obligation to suspend proceedings when the Commission initiates action in a case, even though suspension in judicial proceedings was a matter of treaty interpretation." 1 Unlike at least some French courts, however, at least one Belgian court has done this in a way preserving the status quo, pending Commission action, against claims that the agreements should not be enforced in the interim."
A German court recently certified to the Court of Justice a question concerning the compatibility with article 85 of a fine levied by the Federal Cartel Office under German antitrust law for a practice with "interstate" as well as "intrastate" characteristics. 5 The effect of the certification was to delay the enforcement of the German law for the time being; in that sense, perhaps, it would be proper to classify the case with those in part I of this Article. On the other side of the ledger, however, appear at least 15 cases decided since 1962 in which certification could have been used and was not. Some were inappropriate for the additional procedure; 6 several were based upon a conservative definition of interstate commerce' 7 that the Court of Justice might not accept if asked; but most, including some in the Bun-desgerichtshof, 8 avoided perfectly proper questions of interpretation through a variety of dubious devices. 9 Finally, the German courts have not been willing to use the suspension procedure in favor of Commission action.
One particularly obstinate issue, and it is at the heart of the effort to preserve the national substantive regime, is the matter of expedited proceedings. It has become a commonplace doctrine with the German courts," 0 and to some extent the Dutch, 1 that certification is unavailable in a proceeding for interlocutory relief. American attorneys are familiar with the dispositive role of the temporary restraining order and the temporary injunction in resale-price-maintenance cases, and it should come as no surprise to learn that the same situation obtains elsewhere. The maverick dealer is temporarily enjoined from violating the nonsigner proviso, pending a plenary proceeding that never occurs. The sequence is prevalent enough in Germany to have become a matter of scholarly concern; 2 in time a more refined judicial attitude toward the practice may limit the tendency. In the meantime, however, it has all but blocked most efforts to certify the typical distribution case.
Another issue of some delicacy is the role of article 85 as an inroad on national industrial property laws. Much of the Grundig case involved the conflict between French trademark law and article 85, as the latter bore upon the right of the French holder of Grundig's international mark, Gint, to prevent imports of genuine Grundig products from Germany. Though the recent Parke, Davis decision of the Court of Justice" suggested that mere unilateral exercise of a national patent right to bar infringing imports could not be converted into a forbidden collusive practice under article 85, it was somewhat ambivalent on whether such an exercise could constitute abuse of a dominant position under article 86. Nevertheless, only recently the German Bundesgerichtshof, in a case involving a plant patent, declined to certify this abuse question to the Court of Justice, on the ground that the seed-registration law governing the matter differed qualitatively from the patent law in an (unspecified) way, which prevented the exercise of rights thereunder from leading to the sort of conflict with articles 85 or 86 as might create an interpretation dispute.r This kind of decision, while hardly predictive of results of other cases, does not augur well for expanding the role of the Court of Justice in deciding when the existence, enforcement, or abuse of a national statute conflicts with treaty provisions.
CONCLUSION
What can be gleaned from this cursory review of the implementation and use of article 177? The data are inherently too sketchy to justify pretentious speculations. Certainly they suggest some disappointment of overly optimistic expectations, and such disappointment has found some expression in the literature even if bemusement with the institution as such remains predominant. In the administrative-law field, where the hard work of achieving local cooperation with Luxembourg's pronouncements is not with the tribunals that seek those pronouncements but with the administrative agencies whose actions the certifying courts are there to control, the article 177 process has begun to take hold everywhere but in France. When one recalls that the Commission of the European Communities is an executive organ only, not a full-fledged bureaucracy, and that many of the national decisions attacked in these proceedings are Community orders merely farmed out to these national agencies for implementation, 77 this progressive utilization of the certification procedure turns out to be less surprising and less significant. (1968) . [Vol. 21: Page 1041 The only truly private law field so far subject to Community norms, antitrust, presents a far different picture. Here the federal "encroachment" is upon the interpretation and development of substantive legal doctrinethe essential tasks of the judiciary being asked to abet such encroachment -and is in its substance significantly at variance with the doctrines these courts have, at least so far, enunciated. This variance, explained by the recent and somewhat forced intrusion of antitrust doctrine in judicial traditions rather friendly to restrictive practices," is an unfortunate historical accident, and goes far to explain the relative failure of the certification process. It may be that it explains most of this failure, or timidity; when the Community norms happen to coincide with national law, a friendlier approach to certification might be expected. Ranged against this possibility, however, is the experience in France, where only a few courts even seemed to yield jurisdiction to the Commission in cases in which certification could be used to foster local antitrust policy.
An additional drawback of the current situation is its chilling effect upon uniform, not to mention vigorous, antitrust law enforcement. Five years ago, when I questioned the Commission's overeager assertion of essentially exclusive jurisdiction over Community antitrust enforcement activity (an assertion not envisaged in the original Treaty)," it lacked the political base to exercise this competence and had not shown nor did it seem likely soon to be able to show a level of enforcement activity commensurate with its claims of competence." At the time it seemed preferable, always from the point of view of promoting vigorous antitrust enforcement, to try for the slower but perhaps more solidly based development of national administrative and judicial experience, competence, and vigor in this field. Such a buildup seemed worthwhile even without any great eagerness to use article 177, and despite the unsatisfactory nature of the Commission's right to intervene in proceedings under article 177,81 which permits it only reaction, not action. And it still seems that had national agencies continued to process article 85 and 86 cases instead of accepting Brussels' interpretation of the implementing regulations, 8 8o. Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 57-58, 94. This is not the place to discuss the subsequent history of the Commission's enforcement activity and particularly its acquiescence in the "European size" trend in horizontal agreements and fusions. I would, however, at least point to Markert's comment that present European policies in this regard constitute "a kited check against the future." Markert, Die Richtlinien des amerikanschen lustizministeriums falr die Behandlung von Unternehmenszusammenschliissen ("Merger Guidelines") The opportunity to fashion questionable legal doctrines is only too apparent; at the same time the Commission has little opportunity to do anything about the trend, since it lacks power to intervene in this private litigation absent a certification.
Whether the key to judicial resistance to article 177 has been substantive conflict between applicable doctrines or outright political opposition to federalization, discouraging use of the procedure even where there is substantive harmony, the lesson of the Community to date seems to be that other mechanisms for getting questions before the regional judicial body might be more productive than article 177 certification. One of the most useful might be patterned after the United States Supreme Court's certiorari procedure, allowing either of the parties to invoke the jurisdiction of the central court. Certification of the interpretation problem at issue would no longer be dependent on the discretion, complete or partial, of the originally seized court; 8" instead, it would rest with the certifying party. Perhaps a flood of certifications, even a flood of trivial certifications, would be the consequence. It does seem that only a party interested in and able to afford dilatory tactics would find this gambit worth the cost; nevertheless, exactly in the kind of antitrust litigation previously discussed this would be a real risk. If this proved to be the experience, and perhaps even from the outset, a discretionary power in the regional courts to reject the request might be appropriate. This could be joined to something like our well-known certificate of probable cause 8 " or, indeed, to something resembling the present article 177: If the originally seized court certifies the question the regional court must take it, otherwise it may. At the beginning of an effort at federalization, maximum opportunity to certify questions might well be valuable enough to this essentially political process to overgabengebiet, Apr. as, x966, at 69-70; it has been repeated in subsequent years. The significance of this self-restraint can be gleaned from id., Drucksache IV/2 3 70 (x963 Report), at 46; see Buxbaum, supra note 7, at 67 n.56; for an example of its effects upon the developing case law see, e.g., Decision of Nov. 14, 1963, r4 WuW 437 (Bundeskartellamt ride the fear of excessive use. 85 Thus the self-interest of litigants could be harnessed to the political goal of creating a communal loyalty." In a limited sense-limited because of the contrast between the EEC's highly developed economic and social structure and our early beginnings-these questions and values were reflected in the shift of the United States Supreme Court's own jurisdictional framework from mandatory appellate and certiorari jurisdiction to the discretionary jurisdiction required by the pressure of a docket reflecting an increasingly complex society." All in all, a variety of procedures can be devised and controlled that would encourage wider use of this federalizing device whenever a polity not yet ready for full appellate control of a national judicial system or for a system of inferior federal courts might wish to adopt or adapt the European experiment.
The most important lesson, however, may be merely that of the time span involved in achieving the voluntary assimilation of a supranational court into a national judicial structure. 8 Only a decade has elapsed since the experiment started. Early enthusiasm has faded as national political values have reasserted themselves, but the institutional framework has been introduced and is continuing to work. Perhaps no more is involved than was expressed long ago (1968) . The two may be profitably read in conjunction, particularly in view of Hay's emphasis on the administrative cases.
